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I. INTRODUCTION
The original version of the Pledge of Allegiance was approved by Con-
gress on June 22, 1942 as "I pledge allegiance to the flag of the United States
of America and to the Republic for which it stands, one Nation indivisible, with
liberty and justice for all."1 On June 14, 1954, Congress amended the Pledge
to add the words "under God" after the word "Nation.",2 Commenting on the
House Report that recommended the addition of the words "under God" to the
Pledge, Justice Douglas stated that the new words "in no way run contrary to
the First Amendment but recognize 'only the guidance of God in our national
affairs.' ""
On June 26, 2002, in Newdow v. United States Congress,4 a three judge
panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit announced a
decision holding: (1) that the words "under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance
are a violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment;5 and (2)
that it is therefore a violation of the First Amendment for a public school dis-
trict to have a policy of repeating the Pledge in the classroom each day.6 Ini-
tially, the decision was met with an outcry from politicians, the media, and
many Americans, 7 as well as being in direct conflict with an earlier Seventh
Circuit decision. 8 Then, as if the Ninth Circuit realized its mistake, the original
panel of judges amended their decision by removing reference to the 1954 Act9
that added the words "under God" to the Pledge.' ° As a result, after granting
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I Pub. L. No. 623-435, § 7, 56 Stat. 380 (1942) (codified at 36 U.S.C. § 172).
2 Pub. L. No. 396-297, 68 Stat. 249 (1954).
3 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 440 n.5 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring) (quoting H.R. REP.
No. 83-1693, at 3(1954)).
4 Newdow v. United States Cong., 292 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2002) [hereinafter "Newdow "].
' U.S. CoNsT. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion.").
6 Newdow 1, 292 F.3d at 612.
7 Charles Lane, U.S. Court Votes to Bar Pledge of Allegiance; Use of "God" Called Uncon-
stitutional, WASH. POST, June 27, 2002, at Al (giving examples of President Bush calling
the decision "ridiculous" and Senator Tom Daschle saying it was "just nuts").
8 Sherman v. Cmty. Consol. Sch. Dist. 21, 980 F.2d 437 (7th Cir. 1992).
9 Pub. L. No. 396-297, 68 Stat. 249 (1954).
10 Newdow v. United States Cong., 328 F.3d 466 (9th Cir. 2003) [hereinafter "Newdow H"].
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certiorari, the United States Supreme Court was not presented with the issue of
whether or not the 1954 Act was constitutional, but was instead faced with two
other questions: (1) whether a noncustodial parent has standing to challenge the
policy of repeating the Pledge in public schools, and (2) whether the policy
itself is a violation of the First Amendment. ' Unfortunately, after reversing
the Ninth Circuit's decision on June 14, 2004, it remains unclear what a major-
ity of the Supreme Court Justices think about the First Amendment issue
because the Court concluded that Newdow lacked standing to invoke federal
court jurisdiction. 12
The relationship between religion and the federal government has long
been a sensitive subject in the United States, since before the drafting of the
Constitution. It is hard to know exactly what the framers of the Constitution
meant to say about the proper role of religion in the public realm by their
inclusion of the Establishment Clause in the First Amendment. Application of
this somewhat vague and ambiguous clause has resulted in a noticeable incon-
sistency in the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence.1 3 The
Supreme Court began its career in the Establishment Clause by suggesting that,
in the words of Thomas Jefferson, it was meant to erect "a wall of separation
between church and State."' 4 Ever since the adoption of Jefferson's "separa-
tion" language, the idea of separation has continued to expand the scope and
influence of the Establishment Clause to the point where, now, almost any
action by government that arguably "advances," "coerces," or "endorses" relig-
ious faith may be invalidated.'
5
This note will explore the history of Supreme Court Establishment Clause
jurisprudence to show that although the Ninth Circuit in Newdow arguably
applied Supreme Court precedent correctly, the judges blindly applied the
Supreme Court's three Establishment Clause tests without looking to the his-
tory and context of the Pledge of Allegiance. A well-reasoned Seventh Circuit
decision, specifically addressing the Pledge of Allegiance, will be discussed
because it incorporated the history and context of the Pledge to reach a result
that the Supreme Court could have adopted. This note also will expand on
Justice Thomas' originalist view of the Establishment Clause in his Elk Grove
v. Newdow concurrence to show how the Clause likely became applicable
against the states through incorporation into the Fourteenth Amendment. It is
unlikely that this view will command a majority of the Court in the near future.
Finally, this note will discuss the idea of ceremonial deism that was expounded
upon by Justice O'Connor in her Elk Grove v. Newdow concurrence to ulti-
mately conclude that the Supreme Court needs to officially adopt a ceremonial
deism test to not only uphold the Pledge in the future, but similar ceremonial
references to religion as well.
" Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2301, 2305 (2004).
12 Id.
"3 See discussion infra Parts II.A.1-4 and accompanying notes (detailing the evolution of
Supreme Court Establishment Clause jurisprudence).
14 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878).
1' E.g., Howard Fineman, One Nation, Under.. Who?, NEWSWEEK, July 8, 2002, at 20.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Supreme Court Establishment Clause Jurisprudence
1. The Beginnings
a. Everson: Creating a "Wall of Separation"
Although the Establishment Clause was drafted by Congress in 1789, the
first Supreme Court case to thoroughly focus on the clause was not until 1947
in Everson v. Board of Education.1 6 In Everson, the Court analyzed the history
of why the nation needed the Establishment Clause in upholding a New Jersey
policy that reimbursed parents for their children's bus transportation to all
schools, including religious ones. 7 The Court also adopted Thomas Jeffer-
son's famous words that describe the intent of the clause as being meant to
erect "a wall of separation between church and State."' 8 The fundamental doc-
trines that emerged from Everson were: (1) the constitutionality of religious
neutrality; and (2) the beginning of the Supreme Court's attempt to define the
parameters of the Establishment Clause. 19
b. The School Prayer Cases
In the 1960s, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in a pair
of school prayer cases that further developed Establishment Clause jurispru-
dence while moving the doctrine towards strict separation.2 0 Engel v. Vitale,
the first important school prayer case to come before the Court, invalidated a
state policy directing students to recite aloud a prayer written by school offi-
cials each morning.2' The Court found that formal prayer is a religious activity
and that the Establishment Clause must at least be interpreted to mean that
government should have no business in composing official prayers for recital
by any group of Americans. 22 The Court also reasoned that its decision was
not inconsistent with the fact that groups of Americans often express love for
our country by reciting historical documents and singing anthems that contain
references to God.23 The Court recognized a clear distinction between "patri-
otic invocations of God," on one hand, and the "unquestioned religious exer-
cise" of prayer, on the other.2 4 In addition, the Court mentioned, without much
discussion, that the Establishment Clause was applicable to state-sponsored
religious activities through the Fourteenth Amendment. 25
16 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
17 Id. at 8-16.
19 Id. at 16.
19 Ashley M. Bell, "God Save This Honorable Court": How Current Establishment Clause
Jurisprudence Can Be Reconciled With the Secularization of Historical Religious Expres-
sions, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1273, 1285 (2001).
20 See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
21 370 U.S. at 422.
22 Id. at 425.
23 Id. at 435.
24 Id. at 435 n.21.
25 Id. at 424-25.
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One year after Engle, the Court addressed a similar religious devotional
activity issue in Schempp.26 A state statute required the reading of ten verses
from the Bible each school morning, followed by a recitation of the Lord's
Prayer and then by the Pledge of Allegiance. 27 The Bible reading and recita-
tion of the Lord's Prayer practices were struck down because of their religious
nature, but the majority saw no problem with the recitation of the Pledge.28
Justice Brennan, concurring in the judgment, distinguished the recitation of the
Pledge from the other two morning exercises, stating that "[t]he reference to
divinity in the revised Pledge of Allegiance . . . may merely recognize the
historical fact that our Nation was believed to have been founded 'under God'
[and is] no more of a religious exercise than the reading aloud of Lincoln's
Gettysburg Address .... ',29 The Court in Schempp seemed to follow a two-
part test in order to determine if a particular practice violates the Establishment
Clause: (1) whether there is a secular legislative purpose for the practice; and
(2) whether the primary effect of the practice is to advance or inhibit religion.3°
2. Development of the Supreme Court's Three Establishment Clause
Tests
The Supreme Court has not failed to articulate standards for deciding
Establishment Clause cases. In fact, just the opposite is true; the Supreme
Court has created confusion in the area by articulating several different stan-
dards. Most of the current Justices seem to adhere to the idea that the Estab-
lishment Clause is intended to prevent government harms. To identify those
harms, there are three main tests, which appear to reflect different perceptions
among the Justices about when governmental actions are harmful.3 1 The three
main Establishment Clause tests are: (1) the Lemon test; (2) the endorsement
test; and (3) the coercion test.
a. The "Lemon" Test
With an increasing number of Establishment Clause cases coming before
the Supreme Court throughout the 1960s, it was time to declare a uniform
approach for courts to use when deciding if particular practices violate the First
Amendment. The Court therefore provided a formula in its 1971 Lemon v.
Kurtzman decision.32 For government action to survive the "Lemon test," the
government must have acted: (1) with a secular purpose; (2) with an effect that
"neither advances nor inhibits religion"; and (3) without encouraging "an
excessive governmental entanglement with religion."33 The Court applied the
Lemon factors in nearly every Establishment Clause case from the time the
decision came down in 1971 until the mid-1980s. Although the Lemon test
26 Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
27 Id. at 205.
28 Id. at 223.
29 Id. at 304 (Brennan, J., concurring).
30 See id. at 222.
31 Alan E. Garfield, A Positive Rights Interpretation of the Establishment Clause, 76 TEMP.
L. REV. 281, 285 (2003).
32 See 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
33 Id. at 612-13.
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technically remains good law today, the Court places less emphasis on it and
has increasingly employed alternative tests in more recent Establishment
Clause challenges.3"
b. The Endorsement Test
Justice O'Connor first articulated the "endorsement test" in her 1984
Lynch v. Donnelly concurrence, 35 and a majority of the Court later officially
adopted it in County of Allegheny v. ACLU.36 The test combines the first two
prongs of the Lemon test, asking whether government action has the purpose or
effect of either endorsing or disapproving of religion.37 According to Justice
O'Connor, the basic reasoning behind the test is that "[e]ndorsement sends a
message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the politi-
cal community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insid-
ers, favored members of the political community."38 The endorsement test
does not seem to preclude government from acknowledging religion or from
taking religion into account in making law and policy. It does, however, pre-
clude government from conveying or attempting to convey a message that
religion, or a particular religious belief, is favored or preferred.
c. The Coercion Test
The "coercion test" was formulated by the Supreme Court in Lee v. Weis-
man after announcing that it was unnecessary to apply the Lemon test in order
to find a challenged religious practice unconstitutional.39 Justice Kennedy,
writing for the majority, concentrated on the nature of prayer as a religious
exercise in reaching the decision to ban a graduation prayer.4" He looked back
to earlier school prayer cases, Engel and Schempp, to find that "[c]onducting
this formal religious observance conflicts with settled rules pertaining to prayer
exercises for students."'" In addition to the religious nature of prayer, Kennedy
also wanted to avoid the risk of coercing students to adopt a religious perspec-
tive in the public school setting.n2 Due to the "heightened concerns" of protect-
ing children from coercive pressure in both elementary and secondary schools,
the Court held that the performance of a religious function like prayer at a
public school-sponsored activity was unacceptable. 43 The coercion test thus
14 Bell, supra note 19, at 1288.
35 465 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (writing separately to suggest a
clarification to Supreme Court Establishment Clause jurisprudence in case where Court con-
cluded that a city had not impermissibly advanced religion or created excessive government
entanglement between religion and government by including a creche in its annual holiday
display).
36 492 U.S. 573, 620 (1989) (affirming an injunction that precluded the display of a creche
on the courthouse steps, but reversing judgment regarding a menorah display because its
physical setting was a visual symbol for a holiday with a secular dimension).
17 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687-90 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
38 Id. at 688.
39 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
40 See generally id.
41 Id. at 587.
42 Id. at 592.
43 Id. at 592-93.
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requires that public school children not be presented with situations where they
must either participate in, or protest against, a religious ceremony." 4 Justice
Kennedy, however, emphasized that there were limitations to this holding and
that not "every state action implicating religion is invalid if one or a few citi-
zens find it offensive"4 5 and that "[a] relentless and all-pervasive attempt to
exclude religion from every aspect of public life could itself become inconsis-
tent with the Constitution."46
3. The Three Tests in Practice
a. Wallace v. Jaffree - Purely Religious Legislative Purpose
In Wallace v. Jaffree, the United States Supreme Court confronted an Ala-
bama statute authorizing a one minute period of silence in public schools "for
meditation or voluntary prayer."4 One of the State legislature's purposes for
enacting the statute was "to return prayer to the public schools," which ulti-
mately resulted in the practice being declared unconstitutional.4 8 Although a
mere moment of silence for meditation may have been constitutional, as the
original statute called for, it was amended to specifically add the purpose of
prayer.4 9 The Court concluded that the Alabama legislature passed the amend-
ment with purely religious motives in mind.5" In conducting a Lemon analysis,
the Court concluded that because the amended statute did not reflect a clearly
secular purpose, consideration of the two remaining prongs of the Lemon test
was unnecessary. 51
Justice O'Connor concurred in part in Wallace to point out that a mere
moment of silence would not be a religious exercise.52 Furthermore, she would
have analyzed the issue using her endorsement test "because of the analytic
content it gives to the Lemon-mandated inquiry into legislative purpose and
effect."'53 In the United States, where church and state inevitably cross paths so
that statutes pursuing valid interests often help or hinder religious beliefs,
O'Connor opined that chaos would result if all such statutes were invalidated
under the Establishment Clause.5 4 She also distinguished the Pledge of Alle-
giance from Alabama's modified moment of silence statute in the same concur-
rence, reasoning that, although the words "under God" were later added to the
Pledge just as the purpose of prayer was later added to the Alabama statute in
question, the words "under God" serve to legitimately acknowledge religion's
place in "solemnizing public occasions."55 Ultimately, according to Justice
44 Id. at 594.
45 Id. at 597.
46 Id. at 598.
47 472 U.S. 38, 40 (1985) (quoting ALA. CODE § 16-1-20.1 (Supp. 1984)).
48 Id. at 59-60.
49 Id. at 56-57.
50 Id. at 60.
51 Id. at 56.
52 Id. at 72 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
53 Id. at 69.
54 Id. at 69-70.
55 Id. at 78 n.5.
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O'Connor, the United States Congress did not cross the line as Alabama had in
"affirmatively endorsing the particular religious practice of prayer."'5 6
Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Wallace appeared to be an attempt to
alter the direction of Supreme Court Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
According to Rehnquist, the Establishment Clause was meant to curb the evil
of establishing a national church, or at least preferring one religion over another
on a national level.57 The Chief Justice gave a condensed history lesson about
the Establishment Clause before ultimately coming to the conclusion that it
merely "forbade establishment of a national religion, and forbade preference
among religious sects or denominations. '"58 He reasoned that the founders
never expressed concern about whether the federal government "might aid all
religions evenhandedly."5 9 If the Establishment Clause was intended to rid
government of all references to religion, Rehnquist elucidated, then the Con-
gress that adopted the First Amendment would not have proposed that George
Washington create a day of Thanksgiving for the people of the nation to join
"in returning to Almighty God their sincere thanks for the many blessings he
had poured down upon them."60
b. Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe - Which Test To
Use
The Supreme Court's most recent school prayer case before Newdow,
Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, used all three Establishment
Clause tests to invalidate a school district policy allowing students to perform
an invocation before high school football games. 6 The Court reasoned that in
cases involving facial challenges to state rules on Establishment Clause
grounds, the Supreme Court can assess the constitutionality of an enactment by
reference to the three Lemon factors, "which guide[ J] 'the general nature of
inquiry in this area.' ,62 Under the first prong of the Lemon test, a court must
invalidate a statute if it lacks a secular legislative purpose, and a statute inviting
public prayer in a secondary school setting fails this test.63 The school district
policy was also impermissible because it could send the message to students
and football fans who did not believe in prayer that they were not full members
of the political community. Conversely, those who do believe would feel
included, thus failing the endorsement test.64 Moreover, even if football games
are attended more voluntarily than classes or graduation ceremonies, the Court
decided that a pre-game prayer would have the improper effect of "coercing
56 Id. at 84.
17 Id. at 99 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
58 Id. at 106; see also Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673-74 (1984) ("A significant
example of the contemporaneous understanding of the [Establishment] Clause is... [that in]
the very week that Congress approved the Establishment Clause ... it enacted legislation
providing for paid Chaplains for the House and Senate.").
59 Wallace, 472 U.S. at 99.
6 Id. at 101 (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 914 (1789)).
61 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
62 Id. at 314 (quoting Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394 (1983)).
63 Id. at 314-15.
64 id. at 309.
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those present to participate in an act of religious worship," thus failing the
coercion test as well.65
4. Why Marsh v. Chambers Falls Outside of the Three Tests
It is apparent that the three Supreme Court Establishment Clause tests are
broad enough to be used to invalidate almost any religious practice that the
Justices think should be invalidated. However, these tests will not invalidate
practices that the Court believes are not sufficiently religious in nature, or that
are part of our history and traditions as a nation.
When dealing with certain historical religious practices, the Supreme
Court does not always use the three Establishment Clause tests.66 In Marsh v.
Chambers, the issue was whether the practice of opening the Nebraska Legisla-
ture with a prayer offered by a State-chosen chaplain violated the Establish-
ment Clause. 67  The Court recognized that the "opening of sessions of
legislative and other deliberative public bodies with prayer is deeply embedded
in the history and tradition of this country" and that "from colonial times
through the founding of the Republic and ever since, the practice of legislative
prayer has coexisted with the principles of disestablishment and religious free-
dom."'68 The Court then noted that in 1774, the first Continental Congress
adopted the traditional procedure of opening its sessions with a prayer offered
by a paid chaplain and that Congress has allowed this practice ever since.6 9
Justice Burger, writing for the majority, further noted that in the same week
members of the First Congress voted to appoint and pay a chaplain for each
chamber of Congress, they also approved the draft of the First Amendment
which contained the Establishment Clause.7 °
The long history of legislative prayer formed the backbone of the Court's
decision in Marsh that the Establishment Clause had not been violated by the
Nebraska practice. 7t According to the Court, the invocation of Divine gui-
dance on a public lawmaking body was not an establishment of religion, but
"simply a tolerable acknowledgment of beliefs widely held among the people
of this country."'72 The Court's analysis of historical precedent and context in
Marsh demonstrates that these two analytical tools can be used as "a vehicle
for altering the religiousness of certain practices and symbols."'73 Therefore,
65 Id. at 312.
66 See, e.g., Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
67 Id. at 784.
68 Id. at 786.
69 Id. at 787-88. The Court also pointed out that, "In the very courtrooms in which the
United States District Judge and later three Circuit Judges heard and decided this case, the
proceedings opened with an announcement that concluded 'God save the United States and
this Honorable Court."' Id. at 786. The very same invocation occurs at all sessions before
the United States Supreme Court. Id.
70 Id. at 790 (reasoning that the First Congress' approval of the First Amendment and
appointment of chaplains at virtually the same time could not possibly mean that they
intended the Establishment Clause to forbid what they had just declared acceptable).
71 Id. at 791-92.
72 Id. at 792.
73 Alexandra D. Furth, Comment, Secular Idolatry and Sacred Traditions: A Critique of the
Supreme Court's Secularization Analysis, 146 U. PA. L. REv. 579, 587 (1998) (explaining
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the Court's use of history and context can essentially insulate a practice from
the three Establishment Clause tests, making a practice like employing a legis-
lative chaplain sufficiently secular to avoid constitutional scrutiny.
B. The Newdow Decisions
Michael Newdow is an atheist father whose elementary-aged daughter
attends a public school in California."4 According to both California State and
local school district policies, each school day begins with "appropriate patriotic
exercises" and "[t]he giving of the Pledge of Allegiance to the Flag of the
United States of America shall satisfy" this requirement.75 Although his
daughter is not required to participate in reciting the pledge,76 Newdow filed
suit in the Eastern District of California claiming that she is injured nonetheless
because each school day she must listen to her State-employed teacher leading
her classmates in proclaiming that ours is "one Nation under God."77 Newdow
sought declaratory and injunctive relief in his challenge against: (1) the consti-
tutionality of the 1954 Act of Congress that added the words "under God" to
the Pledge; (2) the California statute requiring daily patriotic exercises in
schools; and (3) the local school district's policy of requiring teachers to lead
their students in reciting the pledge.78
Michael Newdow also had previously filed a similar claim in Florida.79
That claim, however, was dismissed on standing grounds because Newdow's
daughter was not yet of school age.8° Newdow then moved to Sacramento and
after his daughter was enrolled in a public school, he filed suit in Federal Dis-
trict Court.8" According to press accounts, both Newdow's daughter and her
mother are practicing Christians who have no problem with the words "under
God" in the Pledge.82 The mother, Sandra Banning, who has never been mar-
ried to Mr. Newdow, has custody of the child and even sought to intervene in
the case to ensure that her daughter would not "be branded for the rest of her
life as the girl who was the atheist in the pledge case or the girl who didn't like
the Pledge of Allegiance." 83
that the Court analyzes history not only for original intent, but also for its perspective on the
religious nature of symbols and practices).
74 Newdow 1, 292 F.3d at 611.
15 Newdow 1I, 328 F.3d at 482 (quoting CAL. EDUC. CODE § 52720 (West 1989)).
76 See Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (holding that public school chil-
dren are not required to participate in pledging allegiance to the Flag in violation of their
personal beliefs).
77 Newdow II, 328 F.3d at 483.
78 Id.
79 Fineman, supra note 15, at 20 (referring to Newdow v. United States, 207 F.3d 662 (1 1th
Cir. 2000) (seeking to establish the unconstitutionality of the words "under God" in the
Pledge of Allegiance)).
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 See, e.g., Bob Egelko, Girl in Pledge Case Not an Atheist, Mom to Tell Court, SAN FRAN.
CHRON., July 13, 2002, at AI5; Adam Liptak, Subsidiary Issue Enters Pledge Case, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 23, 2002, at A15.
83 Egelko, supra note 82, at A15 (quoting Paul E. Sullivan, attorney for the mother).
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1. Newdow I
On June 26, 2002, two of three judges on a Ninth Circuit panel held that
the 1954 act of Congress which added the words "under God" to the Pledge of
Allegiance was unconstitutional and that the California school district's prac-
tice of teacher-led recitation of the Pledge was a violation of the Establishment
Clause.8 4 The majority started its analysis of the Establishment Clause issue
with a description of the three primary tests that have been used by the
Supreme Court to assess Establishment Clause challenges: (1) the three pro-
nged Lemon test; (2) the endorsement test; and (3) the coercion test.85 The
Ninth Circuit panel reasoned that because the Supreme Court had used all three
tests in its most recent Establishment Clause decision that they were "free to
apply any or all of the three tests, and to invalidate any measure that fails any
one of them."8 6 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit chose to analyze the claims under
all three tests "for purposes of completeness."8 7
Beginning with the endorsement test, the panel found that the inclusion of
the words "under God" in the Pledge and the school district's recitation policy
were both endorsements of religion.88 The panel also found "under God" to be
a profession of the specific belief of monotheism, refuting the argument that the
phrase was merely a description of the historical importance of religion in the
United States or an acknowledgment that many Americans believe in God.8 9
The two judges took the position that the Pledge does not comport with the
principle of governmental neutrality toward religion because it endorses a fun-
damental religious question; whether God exists.9" "To recite the Pledge is...
to swear allegiance to the values for which the flag stands: unity, indivisibility,
liberty, justice, and - since 1954 - monotheism."9 1 The two judges opined that
the Pledge sends a message to non-believers "that they are outsiders, not full
members of the political community, and an accompanying message to adher-
ents that they are insiders, favored members of the political community," which
is exactly what the endorsement test is meant to prevent.
92
The panel then moved on to find that the Pledge itself, along with the
California recitation policy, both fail the coercion test.9 3 In doing so, the panel
followed the Supreme Court's reasoning in Lee v. Weisman that a graduation
prayer was coercive even though the students were not required to participate.94
As in Lee, the recitation of the Pledge puts "students in the untenable position
of choosing between participating in an exercise with religious content or pro-
testing."95 The majority expressed concern that the Pledge may appear to a
84 Newdow 1, 292 F.3d at 612.
85 Id. at 605-07.
86 Id. at 607 (referring to the Supreme Court's most recent Establishment Clause case: Santa
Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 310-316 (2000)).
87 Id.
88 Id. at 607-08.
89 Id. at 607.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 608 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984)).
93 Id.
94 505 U.S. 577, 599 (1992).
95 Newdow 1, 292 F.3d at 608.
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non-believer to be "an attempt to enforce a 'religious orthodoxy' of monothe-
ism."'9 6 Newdow also involved schoolchildren, a group that the Supreme Court
has found to be particularly susceptible to government-sponsored religious
coercion.97
The Ninth Circuit panel also analyzed the Pledge under the Lemon test and
found that the 1954 inclusion of "under God" in the Pledge violated the "pur-
pose" prong.9 8 The United States defended the Pledge statute by urging the
court to recognize that the Pledge in its entirety has secular purposes, including
the solemnization of public occasions. 99 The panel, however, decided to focus
on the 1954 Act alone, concluding that its "sole purpose was to advance relig-
ion . . .. "loo The school district's policy, on the other hand, had the secular
purpose of fostering patriotism and therefore did not fail the purpose prong of
Lemon.' o However, despite the secular purpose, the school district's policy
had the impermissible effect of promoting religion, thus failing the second
prong of Lemon."10
The Ninth Circuit's Newdow decision swiftly provoked significant criti-
cism. Senators and Representatives took to the congressional floors to con-
demn the ruling.' °3 The Senate denounced the decision by a unanimously
approved resolution"° and the House approved a similar resolution by a vote
of 416 to 315 In addition to many major newspapers criticizing the deci-
sion, 10 6 President Bush called it "ridiculous,"' 0 7 while Senate Majority Leader
Tom Daschle said it was "nuts," and Senator Robert Byrd called the judges in
the Newdow majority "stupid."' 0 8
2. Newdow II
After the original Newdow I opinion was issued, Sandra Banning filed a
motion to intervene in the case to challenge Newdow's standing.10 9 Banning
had the responsibility to make important decisions relating to her daughter's
"health, education and welfare" because she held sole legal custody of the
child." The Ninth Circuit reconsidered Newdow's standing to bring the
action and concluded that Banning's right to custody of the child did not
deprive Newdow of his right to seek redress from a constitutional harm to his
96 Id. at 609.
97 Id.
98 Id. Since the 1954 Act failed the "purpose" prong, the panel declined to apply the test's
remaining two prongs. Id. at 611.
99 Id. at 609-10.
'0 Id. at 610.
l01 Id. at 611.
102 Id.
103 See 148 CONG. REc. S6105-S6112 (daily ed. June 27, 2002); 148 CONG. REC. H4125-
H4136 (daily ed. June 28, 2002).
'04 S. RES. 292, 107th Cong. (2002).
105 H.R. Res. 459, 107th Cong. (2002).
106 See, e.g., Editorial, One Nation Under Blank, WASH. POST, June 27, 2002, at A30.
107 Lane, supra note 7, at Al.
108 Carl Hulse, Lawmakers Vow to Fight Judges' Ruling on the Pledge, N.Y. TIMES, June
27, 2002, at A20.
'09 Newdow I, 313 F.3d at 501-02.
"lO Id. at 502.
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parental interests."' The court held that Newdow still had the right as a non-
custodial parent to expose his daughter to his idea of religion without his credi-
bility being destroyed by his daughter's exposure to religious ideas at a state
school.1 1 2 Accordingly, the court denied Banning's motion to intervene and
affirmed Newdow's standing.
1 13
3. Newdow III
On February 28, 2003, the Ninth Circuit panel issued an opinion amending
its original opinion.1 14 The Newdow III decision is significantly narrower than
the panel's original Newdow I opinion. The panel declined to decide the issue
of whether the federal Pledge of Allegiance statue is unconstitutional;" 15 and
the amended opinion only used the coercion test to find that the school dis-
trict's recitation policy violated the Establishment Clause.116 While the panel
still felt free to apply any of the Supreme Court's three tests, it emphasized that
it was unnecessary to apply the Lemon or endorsement tests once the policy
was found to be impermissibly coercive.117 Thus, it appears that the panel may
have abandoned its original strategy of completeness in order to focus on the
ground it presumably felt was the strongest.
The amended opinion, however, did not entirely ignore the 1954 Act
which added "under God" to the Pledge. For example, the amended decision
still argued that the added "under God" language expresses a belief in monothe-
ism, and that the Pledge has a normative and ideological character which makes
it unconstitutional." 8 The amended opinion also addressed something that was
missing from the original opinion: the failure to account for Supreme Court
dicta regarding the constitutionality of the Pledge. Consequently, the panel
mentioned a couple of the instances of such dicta - in Lynch, and County of
Allegheny - and then summarily dismissed it. 9 According to the two judges,
although various Supreme Court Justices have stated that the Pledge itself
as amended is constitutional, no justices have ever specifically suggested that
it would be constitutional for schools to lead children in recitations of the
Pledge. 120
4. Supreme Court Decision, Elk Grove v. Newdow
On June 14, 2004, the Supreme Court issued an opinion in which five
justices managed to avoid the Establishment Clause issue to find instead that
Newdow lacked standing to bring his constitutional claim because of the uncer-
tainty about his parental rights. 2 1 Traditionally, issues of domestic relations
''' Id. at 505.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Newdow v. United States Cong., 328 F.3d 466 (9th Cir. 2003) [hereinafter "Newdow
III"].
1'5 Id. at 490.
116 Id. at 487-88.
117 Id.
118 Id. at 487.
1 '9 id. at 489.
120 Id.
121 Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2301, 2312 (2004).
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have been left to the state courts to decide, and at the time the Ninth Circuit
addressed Newdow's standing there was a California State court order that
gave Banning legal control over their daughter when the two parents could not
agree on a course of action regarding her upbringing. 122 Therefore, the judg-
ment of the Ninth Circuit was reversed without a majority of the Court ever
reaching the First Amendment issue. The majority's failure to address the
Establishment Clause issue did not please all of the members of the Court,
evidenced by three Justices writing concurrences in the judgment for three dif-
ferent reasons. There probably would have also been an additional concurrence
written by Justice Scalia if he had taken part in the consideration of the
issue. 123
Part I of Chief Justice Rehnquist's concurrence, joined by Justices
O'Conner and Thomas, challenged the majority's reasoning for denying
Newdow standing and came to the conclusion that Newdow should have had
standing to bring the action.'1 4 In part II, the Chief Justice told the world
where he wanted the Court to go with the Pledge of Allegiance. Not only did
Congress pass legislation reaffirming the text of the Pledge with findings after
the Ninth Circuit's decision "about the historical role of religion in the political
development of the Nation," but the words "under God" serve "to sum up the
attitude of the Nation's leaders, and to manifest itself in many of our public
observances."' 25 Rehnquist then noted many of the references to God in our
Nation's past, including: George Washington's first inauguration;
Thanksgiving proclamations; the Gettysburg Address; Lincoln's second inau-
gural address; Woodrow Wilson's speech to Congress in 1917 to request a dec-
laration of war against Germany; statements by President Roosevelt and
General Eisenhower; the motto "In God we Trust;" and the Supreme Court
marshal's "God save the United States and this honorable Court." 126 Accord-
ing to the Chief Justice, "[a]ll of these events strongly suggest that our national
culture allows public recognition of our Nation's religious history and charac-
ter." 1 2 7 Furthermore, the Chief Justice described the difference between an
explicitly religious prayer, like the one in Lee v. Weisman, and the phrase
"under God" in the patriotic exercise of reciting the Pledge.' 2 8 To Rehnquist,
there is nothing in the purely patriotic exercise of reciting the Pledge that could
ever lead to an establishment of religion.'2 9 He also discussed the fact that in
our system of popular government, there are three levels of government that
have collaborated to produce the recital of the Pledge in public schools - the
122 Id. at 2309-10.
123 Justice Scalia voluntarily recused himself from consideration of the case "after Pledge
opponent Michael A. Newdow noted that the justice had publicly criticized the idea that
courts had the power to remove the words "under God" from the Pledge" based on state-
ments Scalia made to an audience about the Ninth Circuit decision on January 12, 2002.
Charles Lane & David Von Drehle, Is Justice Scalia Too Blunt to be Effective?, WASH.
POST, Oct. 17, 2003, at A27.
124 Newdow, 124 S. Ct. at 2312-16 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
125 Id. at 2316-17.
126 id. at 2317-18.
127 Id. at 2319.
128 Id. at 2319-20.
129 Id. at 2320.
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federal, state and local. Thus, "[wihen courts extend constitutional prohibitions
beyond their previously recognized limit, they may restrict democratic choices
made by public bodies."' 3 ° Ultimately, giving a child's parent a "heckler's
veto" over a patriotic exercise would overextend the reach of the Establishment
Clause and "would have the unfortunate effect of prohibiting a commendable
patriotic exercise." 31
Justice O'Connor's concurrence is quite helpful in clarifying the Supreme
Court's past Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Unfortunately, at this time
she is the only Justice that subscribes to the view she articiculates. O'Connor
does not want to reduce the Supreme Court to one test when deciding Estab-
lishment Clause issues because different cases call for different approaches.13
When there are issues concerning "government-sponsored speech or displays,"
like the Pledge, O'Connor would use her endorsement test because it "captures
the essential command of the Establishment Clause, namely, that government
must not make a person's religious beliefs relevant to his or her standing in the
political community by conveying a message 'that religion or a particular relig-
ious belief is favored or preferred."" 3 3 Within the context of the endorsement
test, the issue for O'Connor would be whether the words "under God" in the
Pledge qualify for treatment as an instance of ceremonial deism, which allows
for certain references to things divine without violating the Establishment
Clause.134 O'Connor then evaluated the Pledge under four factors that help
determine whether a practice is ceremonial deism and so does not violate the
Constitution.
The first factor is the "History and Ubiquity" of the Pledge. 135 For a prac-
tice to be valid under the idea of ceremonial deism it must have been in place
for much of our nation's history and it must be familiar enough to our nation's
citizens that it can be called ubiquitous. 136 During the fifty years that have
passed since "under God" was added to the Pledge, "a span of time that is not
inconsiderable given the relative youth of our nation," it has been recited "by
millions of children" and has become a routine patriotic act, thus satisfying this
first part of the ceremonial deism test."'
The second ceremonial deism factor is the "Absence of worship or
prayer."138 Here, the relevant viewpoint for deciding if something is in the
nature of worship or prayer is that of a reasonable observer of the practice who
is aware of its history and context. 139 The Pledge meets this factor because
"under God" is not an invocation of God, but is descriptive in nature and is not
conducted by church leaders, but by public school teachers. 4 0 Even if some of
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Id. at 2321 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
133 Id. (quoting County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 627 (1989) (quoting Wallace
v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 70 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring))).
134 Id. at 2323.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Id. at 2323-24.
138 Id. at 2324.
139 Id. at 2325.
140 Id.
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the legislators who voted to add "under God" to the Pledge in 1954 were
attempting to convey a religious message, the continued repetition of the
Pledge over the years in a secular context has made it a cultural, as opposed to
a religious, exercise. 1
41
The third factor is the "Absence of reference to particular religion. 142
The phrase "under God" was added to the Pledge at a time when this nation
was not as religiously diverse as it is today and O'Connor concluded, that at
that time the words represented "a tolerable attempt to acknowledge religion
and to invoke its solemnizing power without favoring any individual religious
sect or belief system."' 14
3
O'Connor's fourth and final ceremonial deism factor is that a practice
must have "Minimal religious content."'" The Pledge meets this factor
because the brevity of the reference to God in the Pledge (1) is meant to solem-
nize an event instead of endorse religion; (2) makes it easy for observers to "opt
out" of offensive language without rejecting the entire practice; and (3) limits
the chance for the government to show a preference for one religion over
another. 45
Based on her analysis of ceremonial deism, O'Connor would also uphold
the practice of reciting the Pledge in schools under the coercion test, just as she
would under the endorsement test.146 Ceremonial deism essentially classifies a
practice as non-religious in character and, as a result, participation in a non-
religious act does not cause coercion in the Establishment Clause sense of coer-
cion, even in a public school setting.
14 7
The last concurrence was written by Justice Thomas, who would prefer to
alter current Supreme Court Establishment Clause jurisprudence and replace it
with an originalist view of religion in our nation. Thomas admitted that the
Ninth Circuit adopted a "persuasive reading" of Supreme Court precedent, spe-
cifically Lee v. Weisman, in striking down the practice of reciting the pledge. 148
Thomas would thus overturn Lee because he does not believe that the Pledge
would pass the coercion test. In his view, the Supreme Court already held that
the Pledge coerces an affirmation of belief in its 1943 Barnette decision, where
the Court held that children could not be forced to recite the Pledge.49
Thomas then went on to explain how the Establishment Clause was originally a
federalism provision, meant to protect the state governments from national
establishments of religion, which should not be incorporated into the Four-
teenth Amendment to be applicable against the states. 50 Thomas ultimately
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 Id. at 2326.
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 Id. at 2327.
148 Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
149 Id. at 2328-29 (citing West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)
(holding that public school children are not required to participate in pledging allegiance to
the Flag in violation of their personal beliefs).
"0 Id. at 2330-33.
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concluded that the state had not created a religious establishment and that the
state had not coerced anyone to participate in an established religion.'
5 1
III. ANALYSIS
Elk Grove v. Newdow represents the first time that the Supreme Court has
been presented with a direct attack on the Pledge of Allegiance. Although
Michael Newdow did not have standing, the issue will most likely come before
the Court again. Whenever that may be, the Court will have to decide to either
uphold the recitation of the Pledge in public schools or to strike it down. Based
on the concurrences in Newdow, as well as past history and precedent, the
Court has various choices about which route to take if it desires to uphold the
recitation of the pledge, some more likely than others.
For instance, the Court could agree with the Seventh Circuit's holding in
Sherman v. Community Consolidated School District 21 of Wheeling Town-
ship.'5 2 In Sherman, the Seventh Circuit wrote a well-reasoned opinion that is
consistent with the Supreme Court's Marsh decision because it looked to the
history and context of the practice of reciting the Pledge, factors outside of the
three primary Establishment Clause tests.
Next, is Justice Thomas' argument about the original meaning of the
Establishment Clause in Newdow. Although it is unlikely that a majority of the
Court would support Thomas' view and the implications of altering years of
Supreme Court precedent, this is not the first time that a Supreme Court justice
has urged the other members of the Court to return to an original reading of the
Establishment Clause.' 5 3 In his Wallace dissent, Justice Rehnquist argued that
a textual and historical view of the First Amendment Religion Clauses leads to
the conclusion that the Establishment Clause was not meant to create a wall of
separation between church and state, but was meant to forbid preference among
existing religious sects or denominations.' 5 4 Again, even with the Chief Jus-
tice, and possibly Justice Scalia on his side, Thomas' argument will most likely
lack the support needed to carry the rest of the Court.
The most likely savior of the Pledge of Allegiance is the notion of ceremo-
nial deism, as articulated most recently by Justice O'Connor. Her concurrence
in Newdow set forth a four-factor test that the Court could use to determine
whether a practice is ceremonial deism. If a practice is ceremonial deism, the
Court could uphold the practice as constitutional and bypass the thorny issues
presented by the Establishment clause altogether.
A. Why the Seventh Circuit Already Had it Right
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit directly con-
fronted the Establishment Clause issue created by the words "under God" in the
Pledge of Allegiance in Sherman, ten years before Newdow reached the Ninth
Circuit. 155 In upholding the constitutionality of an Illinois act very similar to
151 Id. at 2333.
152 980 F.2d 437 (7th Cir. 1992).
153 See, e.g., Wallace, 472 U.S. at 91-114 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
154 See id.
151 Sherman v. Cmty. Consol. Sch. Dist. 21, 980 F.2d 437 (7th Cir. 1992).
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the California act in Newdow, as well as holding that the 1954 Act did not
violate the Establishment Clause, the Seventh Circuit framed the issue as
whether a student who objects to the content of the Pledge should be able to
prevent everyone else at school from reciting it in his presence.
156
The Seventh Circuit began its analysis by acknowledging that the school
prayer cases seem to suggest that any invocation led by a teacher or school
official involving unwelcome words amounts to a constitutional violation:I"7 a
point critical to the Ninth Circuit's reasoning. However, the Seventh Circuit,
unlike the Ninth, questioned whether Establishment Clause Jurisprudence could
be applied mechanically because, arguably, the established tests were "not
devised to identify prayer smuggled into civic exercises."' 58 For instance,
Lemon presented the Supreme Court with whether a state statute providing aid
to sectarian schools violated the Establishment clause. 159 The Seventh Cir-
cuit's approach was more direct, framing the issue as "[m]ust ceremonial refer-
ences in civic life to a deity be understood as prayer, or support for all
monotheistic religions, to the exclusion of atheists and those who worship mul-
tiple gods?"1 60 The Seventh Circuit cautioned that certain phrases cannot be
understood in a vacuum without an appreciation of their context.' 6 1 "Words
take their meaning from social as well as textual contexts, which is why 'a page
of history is worth a volume of logic.'"162 In other words, even in a public
school setting, the real issue is whether the Establishment Clause bars ceremo-
nial references to God.
The Seventh Circuit held that the Establishment Clause does not bar cere-
monial references to God. 163 In reaching this conclusion, the court referred to
many enduring traditions of the founding fathers. For example, James
Madison, who authored the Establishment Clause, issued presidential procla-
mations of religious thanksgiving and fasting.' 6' Thomas Jefferson, who
refused on separationist grounds to issue thanksgiving proclamations as Presi-
dent, wrote the Declaration of Independence which explicitly refers to the "Cre-
ator." 165 Also, the Seventh Circuit followed the Supreme Court's Engel v.
Vitale decision by recognizing that ceremonial references to deity are different
from prayers, which are defined as "supplications for divine assistance."' 166 Far
from calling upon God for His help or blessings, the reference to divinity in the
Pledge recognizes the historical fact that our nation is believed by many to be
founded "under God" and thus "may be no more of a religious exercise that the
156 Id. at 439.
157 Id. at 444.
158 Id. at 445.
159 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 620 (1971).
160 Sherman, 980 F.2d at 445.
161 Id.
162 Id. (quoting N.Y. Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921) (Holmes, J.)).
163 Id.
'64 Id. (citing LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 100 (1986)).
165 Id. at 446. Specifically, the Declaration of Independence states, "We hold these truths to
be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with
certain inalienable rights, that amongst these are Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness."
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
'66 Sherman, 980 F.2d at 446.
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reading aloud of Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, which contains an allusion to
the same historical fact.'
167
Moreover, after discussing the same line of Supreme Court school prayer
cases that are discussed in the Newdow decisions, the Seventh Circuit con-
cluded that if those cases were to be extended to the Pledge then the extension
could not stop there. 168 The reasoning would have to be extended to its logical
extreme: "to the books, essays, tests, and discussions in every classroom" that
offend someone's beliefs. 169 Among the public school students in a population
as large as ours, there are bound to be those who do not agree with the ideas
being taught by teachers and that are contained in the textbooks which students
are required to read and learn.' 70 However, even in a diverse society, where
people are free to believe in what they want, state governments retain the right
to establish curricula in their schools. Those who object to opposing ideas can
exercise their right to send their children to private schools or to teach them in
the home.' 7 1 Ultimately, the Seventh Circuit came to the conclusion that
"[o]bjection by the few does not reduce to silence the many who want to pledge
allegiance to the flag 'and to the Republic for which it stands.' ,172
The Seventh and Ninth Circuits ended up on opposite ends of the spectrum
with regard to the Pledge partly because each framed the issue differently. As a
result, both circuits could be correct in their legal analysis, affecting in turn
how they approached the constitutionality of the Pledge.' 7 3 If the majority of
the Court were to feel obligated to analyze the Pledge under one of the current
Establishment Clause tests, then the Ninth Circuit had a good argument, unless
it adopted Justice O'Connor's view of the endorsement and coercion tests. The
Court, however, could also follow the Seventh Circuit's position, because it
looks to the history and context of the Pledge itself, along with Supreme Court
dicta specifically targeted at the Pledge. The Ninth Circuit should have fol-
lowed suit with the Seventh Circuit which stated that "an inferior court had best
respect what the majority says rather than read between the lines. If the
[Supreme] Court proclaims that a practice is consistent with the establishment
clause, we take its assurances seriously. If the Justices are just pulling our leg,
let them say so."' Consequently, the Seventh Circuit took the Supreme Court
Justices seriously regarding the Justices' statements that there is nothing uncon-
stitutional about "under God" in the Pledge.
The Seventh Circuit is thus in line with the principle discussed above in
Marsh, that merely speaking religious words is not enough to violate the Estab-
167 Id. at 447 (quoting Sch. Dist. of Abington Township. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 303-
304 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring).
168 Id. at 444.
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 Id. at 445.
172 Id. (quoting the Pledge of Allegiance, 4 U.S.C. § 4 (2002)).
173 Philip N. Yannella, Stuck in the Web of Formalism: Why Reversing the Ninth Circuit's
Ruling on The Pledge of Allegiance Won't Be So Easy, 12 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REv.
79, 87 (2002).
174 Sherman, 980 F.2d at 448.
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lishment Clause: history and context matter. 175 At first glance, Marsh may not
appear to be applicable to the facts of Newdow because Marsh involved adults,
not children. Also, legislative prayer has a long history because federal and
state legislatures have been led in opening prayer since the mid to late 1700s,
while the words "under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance were not added until
1954.176 Nevertheless, Marsh is a useful case for showing the potential prob-
lem with the blind application of Supreme Court Establishment Clause prece-
dent that led to the Ninth Circuit's Newdow decisions.
Marsh stands for the principle that a formal utterance of religious words is
not necessarily an Establishment Clause violation because the history and con-
text of the practice may suggest otherwise. The Marsh Court's use of history
essentially bypassed the Establishment Clause tests and proved that the use of
history can be "a vehicle for altering the religiousness of certain practices and
symbols."1 77 The Ninth Circuit panel majority also could have better heeded
the context of the Pledge. Although the Pledge was being recited in a public
school setting, merely mentioning the fact that many of our founding fathers
believed this nation to be founded "under God" is very different from a formal
utterance of prayer. Taken out of their historical context, the words "under
God" could be seen as offensive to some, but when they are examined in the
entirety of the Pledge they are different because they express a belief of those
who founded our nation and thus serve a secular purpose. Just as singing the
National Anthem and reciting such documents as the Gettysburg Address serve
the same purpose. Furthermore, calling upon God in the solemn act of prayer
and the historical mentioning of deity in the context of the Pledge are very
different things.
B. Historical Origin of the Establishment Clause
As Justice Thomas argued in his Newdow concurrence, Establishment
Clause jurisprudence would be much different if the Supreme Court were to
recognize the original intent of those who framed the First Amendment. Chief
Justice Rehnquist made a similar argument in his Wallace dissent when he
discussed the history and traditions leading to the Establishment Clause, espe-
cially the understanding of those who actually promulgated it. An originalist
could argue that the Supreme Court started off on the wrong foot when dealing
with the Establishment Clause in Everson by failing to conduct an adequate
historical analysis of the clause itself. 7 8 The Establishment Clause had basi-
cally been dormant from its inception until the 1940s when the Supreme Court
said that it should be "incorporated" into the Fourteenth Amendment making it
applicable against the states. 179 This was done without adequately considering
the historical purpose of the clause, or even the likely consequences of judicial
175 See discussion supra Part II.A.4 and accompanying notes (detailing the Supreme
Court's reasoning in Marsh v. Chambers).
176 Yannella, supra note 173, at 89.
177 Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 793 (1983); Furth, supra note 73, at 587 (explaining
that the Court analyzes history not only for original intent, but also for its perspective on the
religious nature of symbols and practices).
178 STEVEN D. SMrT, FOREORDAINED FAILURE 4 (1995).
179 Id.; see also Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
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intervention in the area. 180 Two legal scholars have expressed their frustration
that "it is striking in retrospect to observe how little intellectual curiosity the
members of the Court demonstrated in the challenge presented by the task of
adapting, for application to the states, language that had long served to protect
the states against the federal government."'181
There is evidence that the Establishment Clause was originally promul-
gated to prevent our newly created federal government from establishing a
national religion that would have political and governmental privileges like the
Anglican Church in England.182 Originally, there was a distinction between
"separation of church and state" on one hand, and the constitutionally based
freedom from a national religious establishment on the other. 183 The Establish-
ment Clause was not created to disestablish the official Protestant religions that
existed in many of the states at the time.184 There is also evidence that many of
the founders believed that nonpreferential aid to religion by the Federal govern-
ment was permissible.185 Essentially, the Establishment Clause seemed to be
an assignment of jurisdiction to the states to deal with religious matters.186 By
outlawing only national religious establishments, the framers intended to leave
the question of state establishment of religion to the judgment of the states
themselves.' 87 The framers were not alone in their belief, historians have con-
tended that Americans from the founding era understood "establishment of
religion" to refer to the prohibition against the national government's funding
of, or coercing belief in, a particular religious sect.188
Congress was not only prohibited from establishing a national church, but
was also barred from disestablishing, or otherwise interfering with, churches
that had been established by various state and local governments.1 89 When the
First Amendment was adopted in 1789 at least six states had government-sup-
ported churches.' 90 Joseph Story summed up the obvious point of the Estab-
lishment Clause to him when he wrote that "the whole power over the subject
of religion is left exclusively to the state governments."' 9 While that point
may be easy to see, it raises a problem because the special nature of this state
right makes it problematic for the Supreme Court to mechanically incorporate
the Establishment Clause into the Fourteenth Amendment with the rest of the
Bill of Rights. 192 Incorporation of the Establishment Clause into the Four-
180 SMITH, supra note 178, at 4.
181 Id. (quoting Mary Ann Glendon & Raul F. Yanes, Structural Free Exercise, 90 MICH. L.
REv. 477, 481 (1991)).
182 FREDERICK MARK GEDICKS, THE RHETORIC OF CHURCH AND STATE 14 (1995).
183 PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 479 (2002).
184 GEDICKS, supra note 182, at 14.
185 id.
186 SMITH, supra note 178, at 18.
187 GEDICKS, supra note 182, at 14.
188 Id. at 15.
189 AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 32 (1998).
190 Id.
191 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1879
(Melville M. Begelow ed., William S. Hein & Co., Inc., 1994).
192 AMAR, supra note 189, at 33.
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teenth Amendment eliminates a state's right to choose whether to establish a
religion, a right the Clause gave to the states in the first place.1
93
In the nineteenth century, religious minority groups who emphasized their
Americanism, as opposed to their religion, pushed to make separation of church
and state a central tenet of the American constitutional creed. 194 However, the
Constitutional authority for this separation was without historical founda-
tion.1 95 Therefore, those with dreams of separation pushed for a constitutional
amendment that would officially recognize the separation ideal, but when it
never came to fruition they changed their strategy by claiming that the First
Amendment already embodied the idea of separation from the beginning.
196
These early "separationists" claimed that Thomas Jefferson had defined the true
meaning of the Establishment Clause through his words: "a wall of separation
between Church and State. '" '19 7 Then, in 1947, the Supreme Court also adopted
Jefferson's words to serve as proof of the "contemporaneous understanding" of
the founders.198 The Court mistakenly overstated Jefferson's role, however, in
defining the meaning of the Establishment Clause.1 99 Jefferson was in France
at the time Congress actually passed the Bill of Rights.2" Therefore, the Court
would have been better served by looking to the understanding of someone who
actually was present, like James Madison.2" 1 Madison was involved in prepar-
ing various drafts of the First Amendment and was on the committee that
drafted its final language, thus making him a more reliable source into the
minds and wills of the founders' intent. 22 Madison "saw the [First] Amend-
ment as designed to prohibit the establishment of a national religion, and per-
haps to prevent discrimination among sects ... [instead of] requiring neutrality
on the part of government between religion and irreligion. 2 °3 Complete sepa-
ration between church and state as adopted by the Supreme Court could, there-
fore, be viewed with suspicion, having no real authority.2 ° 4
Separation of church and state has become an attractively simple metaphor
and its adoption by the Court has essentially swallowed up the original meaning
of the Establishment Clause.205 This metaphor has seemingly come to be the
only alternative to another metaphor - the union of church and state.20 6 The
problem with this thinking is that these are not the only two options. However,
their simplicity has caused an increasing number of Americans to forget that
there have been, and are meant to be, numerous connections between religion
and government.207 By using their common sense, many Supreme Court Jus-
193 Id. at 34.
194 HAMBURGER, supra note 183, at 481.
195 Id. at 482.
196 Id.
197 Id. at 483.
198 Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947).
199 HAMBURGER, supra note 183, at 483.
200 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91-112 (1985) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
201 Id.
202 Id. at 97-98.
203 Id at 98.
204 HAMBURGER, supra note 183, at 483.
205 Id. at 486.
206 Id.
207 Id.
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ices have recognized that there are certain religious practices that are not estab-
lishments of religion. Nevertheless, under the Court's current Establishment
Clause jurisprudence it is becoming increasingly more difficult to protect these
basic American practices like the recitation of the Pledge. By beginning
Supreme Court Establishment Clause jurisprudence with Everson, which
adopted the overly simplistic view of separation as a wall, the Supreme Court
has effectively eclipsed all other points of view,2 °8 including the views of many
of the framers as well as probably most early Americans. Separation has ended
up barring otherwise constitutional connections between church and state.20 9
Originally, the Establishment Clause stood for a decision by our national
government to stay out of anything concerning the proper relationship between
government and religion.2 10 There never should have been any constitutional
law, theory, or principle dealing with the proper relationship between religion
and the national government. By incorporating the Establishment Clause into
the Fourteenth Amendment the Supreme Court has overlooked that original
understanding.2 11
Now, Justice Thomas favors the Supreme Court changing some of its past
thinking about the Establishment Clause. This would entail looking to the
meaning of the Establishment Clause as it was originally promulgated to avoid
the endless litany of cases that are likely to keep coming in the future, attacking
everything from the Pledge to our national coinage. Under this argument, if the
State of California does not want to allow its children to recite the Pledge each
day, then that is perfectly allowable and consistent with the original intent and
meaning of the Establishment Clause. But, a federal court should not call into
question the constitutionality of reciting the Pledge. Combining this originalist
view with the idea of ceremonial deism leads to the conclusion that while our
national government has every right to maintain certain ceremonial references
to deity, it should be up to the states to see how these practices are handled
within their own borders.
The problem with the above argument, however, is that there would possi-
bly be only two Justices besides Justice Thomas who would subscribe to it,
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia. Moreover, it would require overrul-
ing years of Supreme Court precedent. Hence, O'Connor's view of ceremonial
deism is the most likely option under which the Supreme Court will choose to
uphold the constitutionality of the Pledge.
C. Ceremonial Deism & O'Connor
The phrase "ceremonial deism" was coined by former Yale Law School
Dean Walter Rostow in a 1962 lecture he delivered at Brown University.
21 2
Rostow wanted to reconcile the Establishment Clause with a "class of public
activity which. . . could be accepted as so conventional and uncontroversial as
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to be constitutional. '21 3 He labeled this class "ceremonial deism.' ' 214 Ros-
tow's combination of the words "ceremonial" and "deism" was most likely
intended to describe expressions of and to God in ceremonial, instead of theo-
logical, settings.215 While Rostow's original definition describes the concept
he was expounding upon, it will only get us so far in actual Supreme Court
Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Therefore, it is more useful to examine
how the Supreme Court has actually dealt with ceremonial deism.
The phrase, "ceremonial deism," has only been discussed in two Supreme
Court opinions prior to Elk Grove v. Newdow: Lynch; and County of Alle-
gheny.216 In Lynch, Justice Brennan's dissent discussed practices such as "the
designation of 'In God We Trust' as our national motto, or the references to
God contained in the Pledge of Allegiance to the flag;" he thought that these
practices could best be understood as forms of "ceremonial deism."2 7 Justice
Brennan stated that practices such as the Pledge are "uniquely suited to serve
such wholly secular purposes as solemnizing public occasions, or inspiring
commitment to meet some national challenge in a manner that simply could not
be fully served in our culture if government were limited to purely nonreligious
phrases."2 8 Brennan further opined that such practices are "probably neces-
sary to serve certain secular functions, and that necessity, coupled with their
long history, gives those practices an essentially secular meaning., 219
In Allegheny, the plurality opinion specifically referred to the Pledge of
Allegiance, legislative prayer, and the Supreme Court's own invocation, as
examples of "ceremonial deism" because they serve the legitimate secular pur-
pose of solemnizing public occasions as well as expressing confidence in the
future and encouraging citizens to recognize what is worthy of appreciation in
our society.2 ° Justice O'Connor concurred in the opinion suggesting that such
ceremonial references to God are permissible because of their nonsectarian
nature and their long-standing existence along with the fact that they are "gen-
erally understood as a celebration of patriotic values rather than particular relig-
ious beliefs. 221
Although Supreme Court opinions explicitly have used the phrase "cere-
monial deism" on only a few occasions, the Court implicitly has relied on the
concept at various times throughout its Establishment Clause jurisprudence to
successfully immunize a certain class of activities from Establishment Clause
222scrutiny. For example, while Chief Justice Burger did not specifically refer
to ceremonial deism in his Lynch majority opinion, he used five pages to create
a thorough listing of government practices that all embrace religion. Among
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these practices are the Thanksgiving and Christmas holidays, the national
motto, the Pledge of Allegiance, congressional and military chaplains, the Con-
gressional prayer room, and presidential proclamations for a national day of
prayer. 223 The former Chief Justice seemed to be implying that all of these
practices are permissible notwithstanding the Establishment Clause. More
recent Supreme Court Establishment Clause cases have employed similar
implicit references to the concept of ceremonial deism. 224 But perhaps the best
example of the implicit use of the idea of ceremonial deism is in Marsh. The
Court in Marsh did not merely discuss the constitutionality of historical relig-
ious practices in a hypothetical sense; the Justices looked at the history and
context of legislative prayer to avoid using the recognized Establishment
Clause tests.
Not only did Justice O'Conner discuss the history and context of the
Pledge in relation to its recital in public schools in her Newdow concurrence,
but she also sought to guide future references to ceremonial deism. Although
past cases have referred to the idea of ceremonial deism, O'Connor's concur-
rence sets forth four factors that have been discussed supra. For a majority of
the Court to endorse ceremonial deism, it is important that there be some kind
of test or standard with which the Justices can compare a practice that arguably
violates the protection of the Establishment Clause. Justice O'Connor's cere-
monial deism test is something that the other members of the Court can use in
future cases to advance the idea of ceremonial deism, just as her concurrence in
Lynch originated the often-used endorsement test to enhance Establishment
Clause jurisprudence. Such a test fills a gap in Supreme Court jurisprudence
because it analyzes when a practice should be protected by ceremonial deism
instead of just referring to ceremonial deism in the "I know it when I see it"
sense.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is only a matter of time before the practice of reciting the Pledge of
Allegiance is brought before the Supreme Court again. When that happens, the
Justices can uphold the practice in one of a few ways. The Court could take a
strict originalist approach to the Establishment Clause. However, this is
unlikely because it would entail changing decades of established, although
sometimes confusing, Establishment Clause jurisprudence. To successfully
uphold the Pledge, the Justices will need to analyze the history and context of
the Pledge. To conduct this analysis, the Court should analyze the practice
under the four factors provided by Justice O'Connor in her Newdow concur-
rence or use a similar test. Having an officially recognized formula for decid-
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ing when a practice fits within the definition of ceremonial deism will serve to
save other important practices in our nation that surely will be attacked in the
future.
